Again in 2020, we encountered Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 2020 Pa. Tremendous. Lexis 843 (Pa. Tremendous. Sept. 20, 2020), a choice so weird that it reminded us of a Monty Python film. That call “make use of[ed] a rationale, without delay each paleolithically conservative and pro-plaintiffly radical, that may render any federal “tort reform” statute unconstitutional.” Gustafson concerned a federal statute that preempted most tort litigation involving firearms, the Safety of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005, 15 U.S.C. §§7901, et seq., (“PLCAA”), and declared that the PLCAA violated the Tenth Modification.
Because it didn’t contain prescription medical product legal responsibility litigation, the Weblog didn’t observe Gustafson all that intently – our final point out of it was in 2021, noting that en banc reargument had been granted and the singular panel opinion had been withdrawn. Nonetheless, the choice that resulted from the reargument was a large number. Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 282 A.3d 739 (Pa. Tremendous. 2022) (en banc), produced no majority and 5 totally different opinions from the 9 judges. Furthermore, the general consequence, which was to reverse the trial courtroom’s dismissal of the swimsuit, was opposite to the bulk votes of the person judges. How may that be? Right here’s a short description from a Pennsylvania appellate process article Bexis wrote about Gustafson:
The result in Gustafson thus differed dramatically from the votes of the 9 en banc judges on the deserves of the 2 points. The result was 5-4 in favor of reversal, as 4 judges would reverse on constitutional grounds, and one decide would reverse solely on statutory grounds. On each of the 2 points, nevertheless, the place advocated by the defendants was within the majority. Seven justices agreed that, factually, the Arms Act was relevant to the Gustafson plaintiffs’ claims. By a slimmer margin of 5-4, a majority of the Gustafson judges agreed that the Arms Act was constitutional.
J. Beck, “What Occurs When Precedent Splinters? A Take a look at Gustafson,” Legislation.com (Nov. 17, 2022).
This weird consequence had one helpful impact, it nearly pressured the Pennsylvania Supreme Court docket to take the inevitable attraction in an effort to clear up the mess. Which it did. See Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 296 A.3d 560 (Pa. 2023) (granting overview).
And final month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court docket did certainly clear up the mess. See Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 2025 Pa. Lexis 442 (Pa. March 31, 2025).
We didn’t have lots of curiosity within the preemption aspect of Gustafson, since solely specific preemption was at situation, and the PLCAA’s preemption language just isn’t much like any of the FDCA’s specific preemption language. Certainly, the amicus temporary Bexis co-wrote (with Matt Vodzak) in Gustafson solely addressed the constitutional situation. However the Pennsylvania Supreme Court docket’s Gustafson determination truly overperformed on preemption – from our perspective. The choice acknowledges the demise of the presumption in opposition to preemption in specific preemption circumstances
[W]hen a Congressional statute comprises an specific preemption clause, courts don’t invoke any presumption in opposition to pre-emption. Immediately, we discover that the PLCAA comprises such an specific preemption clause, which explicitly preempts state regulation relative to certified civil legal responsibility actions. Thus, we don’t apply any presumption in opposition to preemption and, as a substitute, give attention to the PLCAA’s plain language.
Id. at *19 (citations and citation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Any longer we’ll be citing this holding from Gustafson, along with the Supreme Court docket case it quoted and adopted, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-free Belief, 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016), in any specific preemption briefing in Pennsylvania state courtroom. It shouldn’t be obligatory, given the US Supreme Court docket holding, but when the Third Circuit can ignore the Supreme Court docket, and never thoughts protruding like a sore thumb, then we may see among the Pennsylvania judiciary doing the identical – however not after Gustafson confirmed the presumption’s demise.
In spite of everything, 4 judges on the Gustafson en banc panel purchased an unprecedented argument that the Tenth Modification one way or the other makes all federal tort reform unconstitutional. Fortuitously, cooler heads prevailed – unanimously – on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court docket. First, the courtroom adopted the “presumption of constitutionality.” 2025 Pa. Lexis 442, at *43. Subsequent, it discovered that the federal structure’s Commerce Clause was a lot broad sufficient to cowl specific preemption of state common-law claims. This analysis doesn’t happen in a vacuum; fairly Congress has appreciable leeway. “[W]e usually are not required to find out if a regulated exercise truly has a considerable impact on interstate commerce, however solely whether or not a rational foundation exists for therefore concluding.” Id. at *49 (quotation and citation marks omitted). Right here, the “interstate nature of the [regulated] trade can’t be disputed,” because the product was made in a single state however bought and brought about hurt in one other. Id. at 49-50. “Below these circumstances, . . . it was affordable for Congress to conclude that these fits would financially affect the firearms trade.” Id. at *50 (quotation omitted). “Congress fastidiously crafted the PLCAA to make sure the Act solely barred fits that immediately concerned merchandise and defendants engaged in interstate commerce.” Id. at *52 (quotation omitted). The statute’s definitions ensured that it “require[d] exercise in interstate commerce to have already occurred,” and thus did “not compel anybody” to create the commerce that it regulated. Id. at *53.
As a result of the PLCAA’s preemption of state tort regulation was inside Congress’ Commerce Clause energy, the Tenth Modification, which applies solely to “powers not delegated to the US,” couldn’t contact it. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. modification X). “[N]umerous courts” had already “rejected arguments that the PLCAA violates the Tenth Modification.” It didn’t “commandeer” Pennsylvania or every other state to do something “affirmative,” solely to chorus from entertaining sure sorts of product legal responsibility lawsuits. Id. at *56-57.
Likewise, the plaintiffs’ (and the unique Superior Court docket opinion’s) reliance on Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) – ordinarily one of many Weblog’s favourite circumstances – was not nicely taken. Erie merely requires utility of current state regulation in variety circumstances. Id. at 63-64. Gustafson was by no means even in federal courtroom. The choice acknowledged, that instantly earlier than the Erie quote that plaintiffs touted was the phrase: “[e]xcept in issues ruled by the Federal Structure or by acts of Congress” – exactly the area of interest for any federal tort reform statute. Id. at *58 (emphasis unique). Federal acts are “enforced over relevant state regulation pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.” Id. (footnote omitted):
To the extent the PLCAA requires state judges to dismiss civil actions that would in any other case proceed underneath state regulation, that requirement doesn’t violate the anticommandeering doctrine, however is fairly a product of the Supremacy Clause.
Id. That’s to say, preemption correctly applies. States usually are not commandeered. They continue to be free to enact or create any state regulation they need – topic to the preemptive energy of this (or every other) congressional statute.
[T]he PLCAA doesn’t bar states from enacting any regulation and as a substitute merely preempts state regulation in relation to certified civil legal responsibility actions. . . . Below the PLCAA state legislatures stay free to cross any statute they deem acceptable, whereas the [PLCAA] doesn’t restrict states’ capability to acknowledge new causes of motion by way of widespread regulation. Nor does the predicate exception prohibit states from decoding state statutes by way of their courts.. . . . States stay free, both by way of their legislatures or their courts, to acknowledge any reason behind motion they deem acceptable. All of the PLCAA . . ., does is preempt sure causes of actions.
Id. at *60-61 (citations omitted).
Lastly, the Supremacy Clause demonstrates that federalism doesn’t give states the unfettered energy to impose tort legal responsibility that plaintiffs claimed. Federal preemption applies underneath the PLCAA (and usually) in opposition to “tort actions no matter what department creates them. It doesn’t matter if they’re developed by the courtroom or codified by the legislature.” Id. at *65 (quotation and citation marks omitted). Preemptive statutes thus have “no affect on how states select to allocate their lawmaking authority.” Id. at *66.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court docket’s Gustafson opinion was unanimous. That courtroom has a well-deserved pro-plaintiff fame, however even it balked the notion that the Tenth Modification one way or the other precludes Congress from limiting state common-law tort litigation by way of preemptive statutes. We hope that Gustafson is the ultimate nail within the coffin of that weird concept, the antediluvian views of a handful of regulation college professors (2023 Pa S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 179) however.
